

~~SECRET~~OLL/LD
INCOMING

14/ /

FRP: .2, .5, . .

IMMEDIATE

25X1

84 5820748

SSO

PAGE 001

NC 5820748

TOR: 291227Z NOV 84

25X1

OO RUEAIB
 ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
 STU6792
 OO RUEHC
 DE RUEHIL #4145/01 3340915
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 290909Z NOV 84
 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2272
 INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1944
 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8447
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1557
 RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6530
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4715
 BT
 S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 24145

EXDIS

NEW DELHI PASS SENATORS NUNN AND GLENN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PINS, PK
 SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ~~SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~ MET WITH MUNIR KHAN, CHAIRMAN PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, AND SENIOR OFFICIAL FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS NOVEMBER 27 FOR EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. MUNIR KHAN DENIED ANY PAKISTANI INTEREST IN WEAPONS. HE SAID GOP SHARES U.S. CONCERN OVER NON-PROLIFERATION BUT INSISTED SOLUTIONS HAD TO BE FOUND IN SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT NOT WORLD NPT OR IAEA CONTEXT. HE AND FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NAIK IDENTIFIED INDIA AS STUMBLING BLOCK. END SUMMARY.

3. SENATORS NUNN AND GLENN, STAFFER LEONARD WEISS, AND I MET NOVEMBER 27 WITH MUNIR KHAN, CHAIRMAN PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NAIK, AND ADDITIONAL SECRETARIES KHURSHID HYDER AND NAJMUDDIN SHAIKH FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES.

4. MUNIR LED OFF STATING GOP SHARED OUR CONCERN ABOUT PROLIFERATION. HE SAID GOP HAD TAKEN MANY INITIATIVES TO DE-NUCLEARIZE ALL OF SOUTH ASIA WHICH WOULD BE

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

84 5820748

SSO

PAGE 002
TOR: 291227Z NOV 84

NC 5820748

COMPATIBLE WITH OUR WORLDWIDE APPROACH. SOME YEARS AGO PRESIDENT ZIA HAD PROPOSED TO INDIAN PRIME MINISTER DESAI ADOPTION OF A JOINT DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE NUCLEAR OPTION IN TERMS OF NO MANUFACTURE OR NO ACQUISITION BY EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN. ZIA HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SIGN THE NPT OR ADOPT IAEA FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS. INDIA OPPOSED. SIMILAR POSSIBILITIES HAD BEEN REITERATED TO THE INDIRA GANDHI GOVERNMENT AND MOST RECENTLY PRESIDENT ZIA IN CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI HAD AGAIN PROPOSED A REGIONAL OR BILATERAL RENUNCIATION SCHEME. MUNIR SAID HE AGREED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT ADD TO THE SECURITY OF A SMALL COUNTRY LIKE PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN'S OBJECTIVE IS POLITICAL SECURITY. WE HAVE TO FIND A RESPONSE TO A DIFFICULT SITUATION.

5. SENATOR GLENN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIANS THAT THE CHINESE PROGRAM HAD LED TO THE INDIAN EXPLOSION WHICH HAD INCREASED PAKISTANI CONCERNS. HE FAVORED A DUAL-TRACK APPROACH TO PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. ON THE ONE HAND, NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS FOR REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE, ON THE OTHER HAND, PRECLUDING HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION. HE TALKED OF HIS SPONSORSHIP OF THE NP ACT AND SAID HE SOMETIMES THOUGHT THE NP STRUGGLE WAS LIKE KEEPING A FINGER IN THE DIKE. IT MIGHT BE FUTILE, BUT HE WOULD KEEP TRYING.

6. PAKISTAN ALONG WITH ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, AND ISRAEL CONCERNED HIM GREATLY. BHUTTO HAD CLEARLY SOUGHT A WEAPONS CAPABILITY. HE THOUGHT PAKISTAN MIGHT FOLLOW EITHER THE REPROCESSING OR THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM ROUTE. THE ARREST IN HOUSTON OF INDIVIDUALS SMUGGLING KRYPTON SWITCHES WHICH WE THOUGHT WERE INTENDED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON TRIGGER USE RAISED SERIOUS CONCERNS. THE FAILURE DURING THE BUCKLEY-ZIA NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE U.S. TO GET A COMMITMENT RENOUNCING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AS DISTINCT FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH ZIA HAD RULED OUT, WAS TROUBLESOME. WE WERE BOTHERED BY OUR KNOWLEDGE OF TEST SITE CONSTRUCTION. PRESS REPORTS THAT PAKISTAN WAS SEEKING A MISSILE DELIVERY CAPABILITY FROM THE FRG OTRAG ORGANIZATION, WHILE PERHAPS DISINFORMATION, WERE ALSO A SOURCE OF CONCERN. HE THOUGHT PAKISTAN LIKE ISRAEL MIGHT BE PLANNING TO DEVELOP WEAPONS WHILE STOPPING SHORT OF TESTING. IN EXPRESSING THESE CONCERNS HE WAS NOT A "LONE RANGER." HE WAS REFLECTING THE GENERAL AMERICAN CONCERN SHARED BY THE EXECUTIVE, CONGRESS, AND PUBLIC OPINION. HE WONDERED IF THERE WERE NOT PAKISTANIS WHO THOUGHT WEAPONS WOULD BE THE NEEDED "BIG EQUALIZER" TO DEAL WITH INDIA. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WANTED TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN BUT THAT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF PAKISTAN FURTHER DEVELOPED A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

EXDIS

NEW DELHI PASS SENATORS NUNN AND GLENN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PINS, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

7. MUNIR REPLIED THAT WE SHARE YOUR CONCERN AND RECOGNIZE THAT WE WOULD BE "LOSERS." THEREFORE, PRESIDENT ZIA HAS REPLIED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER. YOU NOW HAVE WRITTEN ASSURANCES THAT THERE WILL BE NO NUCLEAR "EXPLOSIONS." WE UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION. NAIK INTERJECTED THAT ZIA'S NOVEMBER 7 LETTER IS EXPLICIT IN ASSURING THE U.S. THERE WILL BE "NO

SECRET

SECRET

84 5820748

SSO

PAGE 003

NC 5820748

TOR: 291227Z NOV 84

EXPLOSION."

8. SENATOR GLENN SAID, GREAT. WHY DON'T YOU THEREFORE SIGN THE NPT AND ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS? NAIK REPLIED THAT WE SUPPORT THE NPT CONCEPT BUT THE REALITY WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH IS SOUTH ASIA. WE WILL SIGN WITH INDIA TOMORROW. GLENN SAID SINCE INDIA DID NOT YET HAVE A WEAPON, UNILATERAL GOP SIGNATURE WOULD SEND THE RIGHT SIGNALS AND HELP PRECLUDE ANY EVENTUAL INDIAN WEAPONS PROGRAMS.

9. MUNIR SAID THAT THE SENATOR WAS CORRECT AS FAR AS AN IDEAL WENT BUT THAT PAKISTAN LIVED IN THE REAL WORLD. THE GOP HAD TO BE ATTENTIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND TO THE HISTORY OF THE SUBCONTINENT. A MATCHING MOVE BY INDIA WAS A PREREQUISITE FOR GOP MOVEMENT. HE HAD MANY TIMES DISCUSSED THIS WITH SENIOR INDIANS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE HAD POINTED OUT TO RAMANA AND OTHERS THAT INDIA COULD NOT AFFORD THE RESOURCE COMMITMENT THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO MATCH THE CHINESE. HE HAD TOLD RAMANA THAT INDIA AND PAKISTAN SHOULD THINK ABOUT WHAT THEY WERE BEQUEATHING TO OTHER GENERATIONS. HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE INDIAN EXPLOSION IN PAKISTANI MINDS EQUATED TO A SEARCH FOR INDIAN HEGEMONY. IT WORSENERED THE SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA. HE HAD NOT, HOWEVER, BEEN PERSUASIVE. HE THOUGHT THE U.S. COULD HELP WITH INDIA. SURELY, SOME STEPS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. SOUTH ASIA COULD ADOPT THE TREATY OF TLATOLOCO APPROACH. PAKISTAN HAD LONG AGO PROPOSED A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. THE U.S. BELATEDLY SUPPORTED THAT CONCEPT IN THE UN, BUT INDIA REMAINED OPPOSED. "WE REQUEST YOUR COOPERATION IN PERSUADING INDIA."

10. SENATOR GLENN SAID HE WOULD INDEED PURSUE THIS SUBJECT WITH INDIA. BUT IF PAKISTAN HELD THE VIEWS MUNIR WAS EXPOUNDING, WHY WERE THEY PROCEEDING WITH A HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND A REPROCESSING PROGRAM?

11. MUNIR SAID WE ARE NOT BUILDING A REPROCESSING PLANT. TALK ABOUT A CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE 15 KILOS OF PLUTONIUM A YEAR IS NONSENSE. WE HAD AN AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE FOR A PLANT THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDER SAFEGUARDS. THE FRENCH RENEGED. WE NOW SEEK DAMAGES - FOR CONTRACT VIOLATION TO SETTLE THIS DISPUTE. OR, IF THEY WOULD BUILD THE FACILITY, WE WOULD ACCEPT FRENCH INSPECTORS AS WELL AS IAEA INSPECTORS. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO PUT SUCH A FACILITY INTO AN INTERNATIONAL PLUTONIUM REGIME AS TALKED ABOUT DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, BUT TODAY WE HAVE NO REPROCESSING CAPABILITY. IT IS "ABSOLUTELY WRONG" TO SAY PINSTECH IS SUCH A FACILITY. IT COULDN'T PRODUCE ENOUGH PLUTONIUM IN A HUNDRED YEARS FOR A BOMB IF IT WERE ACTIVE AND IT IS INACTIVE. NOR ARE WE PRODUCING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. WE HAVE A FEW "STUTTERING CENTRIFUGES. OUR SMU CAPABILITY IS MINIMAL. YOU FLATTER US BUT YOU EXAGGERATE OUR CAPABILITY. NAIK ADDED THAT THE ZIA LETTER ALSO GIVES ASSURANCES ABOUT PAKISTAN'S URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAM.

12. SENATOR GLENN ASKED ABOUT A. Q. KHAN'S STATEMENT THAT THE WESTERN MONOPOLY HAS BEEN BROKEN, ETC.? MUNIR REPLIED IT WAS A QUESTION OF A SCIENTIST PATTING HIMSELF ON THE BACK.

13. WEISS SAID HE WAS CURIOUS ABOUT THE ZIA-REAGAN LETTER. WHAT ABOUT PROCUREMENT OF TRIGGER MECHANISMS? WHAT ABOUT THE TESTING OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE LENSES? IS IT THE CASE THAT WHAT HAS BEEN SEEN IN THE PAST WILL NOT BE SEEN IN THE FUTURE?

SECRET

SECRET

84 5820748

SSO

PAGE 004

NC 5820748

TOR: 291227Z NOV 84

14. MUNIR SAID THAT IF A COUNTRY NEEDS TO PROCURE A
EXDIS

NEW DELHI PASS SENATORS MUNN AND GLENN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PINS, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

SWITCH FROM ABROAD, THAT COUNTRY CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY FOR A WEAPONS PROGRAM. WE SHOULD NOTE THAT EVERY TIME ISSUES CAME BEFORE THE CONGRESS INVOLVING OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN, "A RABBIT IS PULLED OUT OF A HAT." IT HAD HAPPENED IN CANADA AND IT HAD HAPPENED IN HOUSTON. IN HIS OPINION THE HOUSTON BUSINESS HAD BEEN A "TRAP AND FRAMEUP." THE GOP WOULD NEVER DO ANYTHING LIKE THAT. OUR PROCUREMENT PROGRAM IS FOR R&D AND FOR KANUPP. IT IS NECESSARY BECAUSE CANADA HAD RENEGED ON ITS COMMITMENTS. THE CANADIANS WANT IT BOTH WAYS. THEY WANT IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO BE MAINTAINED BUT THEY WOULD NOT PROVIDE SPARE PARTS. KANUPP IS OPERATING AT EIGHTY PERCENT AFTER EIGHT YEARS OF THE EMBARGO BUT THE GOP HAD HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, TO FIND PRESSURE TUBES ELSEWHERE.

15. WEISS INTERJECTED THAT CANADA WANTED FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS BEFORE CONTINUING TO SUPPLY. MUNIR AGREED AND SAID THEY HAD BEEN TOUGHER THAN THE U.S. WITH TARAPUR. WE HAD COMPROMISED OUR PRINCIPLES FOR INDIA. GLENN SAID HE REGRETTED TO THIS DAY HIS 48-47 DEFEAT IN THE SENATE ON TARAPUR. HE STILL FELT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD MADE A MISTAKE, BUT THAT WAS IN THE PAST. MUNIR COMMENTED THAT WHILE IT WAS IN THE PAST WE HAD KEPT TARAPUR GOING FOR INDIA BY GETTING PARTS AND FUEL SUPPLIED FROM FRANCE, ITALY, AND WEST GERMANY. ON THE OTHER HAND, PAKISTAN GETS NO CREDIT FOR CONTINUING SAFEGUARDS ON KANUPP EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO DO SO. WHAT MORE COULD WE DO, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY. WEISS SUGGESTED HE PUT THE PAKISTAN FUEL FABRICATION PLANT UNDER SAFEGUARDS. MUNIR REPLIED THAT WE HAD BUILT THE FABRICATION FACILITY OURSELVES. HE OBSERVED THAT IF CANADA HAD COOPERATED, PAKISTAN WOULD NOT HAVE NEEDED TO BUILD A FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY. HE ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS CLUB AND ITS CONTROLS HAS AND IS LEADING TO DANGEROUS SELF-HELP EFFORTS AROUND THE WORLD. MEASURES AIMED AT LIMITING PROLIFERATION HAVE SERVED TO PROMOTE IT.

16. WEISS ASKED WOULDN'T YOU WELCOME COOPERATION ON CHASMA? YOU NEED ENERGY FROM NUCLEAR POWER. PUT YOUR PROGRAM UNDER FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND YOU WILL HAVE HELP FROM THE REST OF US. WHY NOT THINK OF THIS TRADEOFF?

17. MUNIR REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT POINT. WE HAVE CONSIDERED IT. IN OUR VIEW OUR FRIENDS SHOULD HELP US WITH CHASMA AND WE ARE READY TO PUT CHASMA UNDER SAFEGUARDS. HE ASKED IF WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT IN EFFECT OUR THREE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR ANNUAL AID PROGRAM WAS BEING WASTED ON IMPORTING OIL SIMPLY BECAUSE WE WILL NOT HELP PAKISTAN DEVELOP NUCLEAR POWER. WE ARE BEING UNFAIRLY PUNISHED, HE ASSERTED. GLENN ASKED ABOUT CAPITAL COSTS FOR CHASMA. MUNIR REPLIED THEY ARE NOW ESTIMATED AT TWO BILLION DOLLARS FOR A 900 MEGAWATT PLANT BUT EVERY DAY YOU DELAY HELPING US THE PRICE ESCALATES. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE NON-PROLIFERATION ACT PRECLUDED U.S. HELP ON CHASMA WITHOUT FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS BUT WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE

SECRET

SECRET

84 5820748

SSO

PAGE 005

NC 5820748

TOR: 291227Z NOV 84

 HAD DONE FOR INDIA AND LET THE FRENCH AND GERMANS HELP.
 -

18. I ASKED, REFERRING BACK TO MUNIR'S INITIAL STATEMENT FOR A BIT MORE CLARITY REGARDING HIS REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN'S SEARCH FOR POLITICAL SECURITY. MUNIR REPLIED THAT PAKISTAN NEEDED ASSURANCES AGAINST "NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL." IN THIS REGARD PAKISTAN SOUGHT STANDBY GUARANTEES FROM THE SUPERPOWERS, BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. GLENN ASKED IF PAKISTAN SOUGHT A U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. MUNIR SAID WE SEEK AN UMBRELLA AGAINST EITHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. NAIK ADDED THAT SINCE 1968 IN THE NPT NEGOTIATIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY, PAKISTAN HAD SOUGHT SUCH GUARANTEES. THEY HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED STRAIGHTFORWARD NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES BUT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT WE HAD TROUBLES WITH THAT FORMULA SINCE IT SEEMED TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH OUR NATO AND RIO TREATY COMMITMENTS. THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR WARSAW PACT COMMITMENTS. UNFORTUNATELY, WHILE PAKISTAN WANTED TO

EXDIS

NEW DELHI PASS SENATORS NUNN AND GLENN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PINS, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

FIND A FORMULA, THEY HAD NOT YET FOUND A WAY TO MEET ALL THE CONSTRAINTS BUT SUCH AN INITIATIVE COULD HELP AVOID A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. SENATOR NUNN ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT A U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. NAIK SAID THE AMBASSADOR HAD MENTIONED IT. I SAID I HAD NEVER SAID A WORD ABOUT A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA FOR PAKISTAN. NAJMUDDIN SHAIKH SAID THERE IS A MISUNDERSTANDING. THIS STORY SURFACED IN DELHI. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY AND OTHERS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO NATO TYPE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA FOR PAKISTAN.
 -

19. NAIK THEN SUMMED UP. PAKISTAN WOULD SIGN THE NPT IF INDIA SIGNS. LIKEWISE FOR FULLSCOPE SAFEGUARDS. LIKEWISE FOR A BILATERAL NPT OR A BILATERAL ACCEPTANCE OF SAFEGUARDS. PAKISTAN WOULD ALSO WELCOME A SOUTH ASIA-WIDE DECLARATION RULING OUT THE MANUFACTURE OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR ANY OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO DEAL WITH THE REGIONAL PROBLEM. WEISS ASKED WHY NOT SEPARATE DECLARATIONS BY PAKISTAN AND INDIA? NAJMUDDIN SAID THAT DESAI HAD MADE SUCH A DECLARATION FOR INDIA BUT PAKISTAN HAD POINTED OUT THAT UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS WERE NOT BINDING ON SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS. PAKISTAN HAD PROPOSED A JOINT DECLARATION THAT WOULD BE BINDING, BUT...
 -

20. SENATOR GLENN CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY SAYING HE DID NOT WANT ANYTHING TO GET IN THE WAY OF THE IMPROVED U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATION WHICH WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT GIVEN THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER TEN TENSIONS IN THE AREA. HE NOTED THAT MUNIR AND OTHERS HAD SPOKEN OF DISINFORMATION CIRCULATED TO EMBARRASS PAKISTAN. PROBABLY THE ALLEGATION OF LIBYAN HELP (E.G. YELLOW CAKE) FOR THE ISLAMIC BOMB WAS IN THAT CATEGORY, BUT THE U.S. HAD OTHER HARD DISTURBING INFORMATION. HE REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO THE GOP NOT PROCEEDING WITH A WEAPONS PROGRAM AND HE THANKED HIS PAKISTANI FRIENDS FOR A HELPFUL AND FRANK DISCUSSION.
 -

21. COMMENT: GOOD EXPOSITION OF DIFFERING VIEWS BUT SKEPTICISM RE GOP ASSERTIONS AND POLICIES

SECRET

SECRET

84 5820748 SSO

PAGE 006
TOR: 291227Z NOV 84

NC 5820748

PERSISTS. HINTON
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET